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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Medical and scientific research today is being driven by private, for-
profit biotechnology corporations, either acting alone or through 
collaboration with academic institutions in the form of large medical-
industrial complexes.  This alignment of the scientific academy with 
corporate capital is reaping enormous scientific dividends, with the 
potential for equally enormous financial gain.  In fact, the linking of 
academic institutions and the scientific imperative2 with the financial capital 
and profit motivations of the corporate sector has created something of a 
perfect storm.  
 The public has been assailed over the last several years with news of 
scientific breakthroughs regarding stem cell technology, therapeutic 
cloning, and reproductive cloning.  The speed at which these developments 
have occurred has been awe inspiring, but also somewhat alarming if one 
believes, as I do, in the importance of reasoned, thoughtful discourse on this 
kind of research and its implications for society.  If the research directions 
and decisions are being determined within the private boardrooms of 
corporate America (and the world), one might reasonably ask whether the 
wealth of bioethics literature, the public discussions, the presidential 
bioethics commissions, and the national advisory boards are having any 
impact at all on that decision making.  In other words, is there room for 
bioethics discourse in the boardroom?  If so, who will initiate it?  How 
would a private, for-profit corporation create an ethical climate for decision 
making that welcomes and takes into account bioethics theories and 
principles? 
Perhaps because I teach Bioethics and the Law, Professor Lynne Dallas’s 
work on ethics and corporate climate3 started me thinking about the 
application of her theoretical approach to this realm of bioethics.  More 
specifically, I wondered how this kind of analysis might be applied to that 
of the biotechnology industry and the medical research enterprise, a setting 
that is a step removed from the direct delivery of health care services.  
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Given the enormous financial and scientific incentives at play, it seems a 
timely and potentially fruitful enterprise to apply the lens of corporate 
theory to bioethics decision making within this sector. 
This article begins in Part II with a brief description of bioethics as a 
discipline, with particular emphasis on the role of bioethics discourse and 
discussion in the current societal debate over human stem cell research and 
therapeutic cloning.  Part III examines the trend within the biotechnology 
industry of utilizing private ethics advisory boards as a mechanism for 
incorporating bioethics analysis into the corporate decision-making process, 
with a focus on corporate stem cell research.  Part IV then explores the 
structural components of corporate bioethics consultation, the identity crisis 
that this form of consultation has created within the field of bioethics, and 
the extent to which these attempts to bring bioethics into the corporate 
boardroom have been effective in creating a “bioethical climate” for 
decision making.  The article concludes with the assertion that the 
biotechnology industry, in the highly contested realms of human stem cell 
and embryo research, bears a corporate responsibility to integrate bioethical 
analysis and discourse into its decision-making processes.  
II.  WHY BIOETHICS? 
A.  Bioethics Defined 
Bioethics is a field of academic study that originated in the 1970s,4 and is 
defined as the “systematic study of the moral dimensions—including moral 
vision, decisions, conduct, and policies—of the life sciences and health 
care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary 
setting.”5  Although once focused on principle-based ethical analysis 
(autonomy, beneficence, distributive justice), the field of bioethics has 
greatly expanded its repertoire to include narrative bioethics, critical race 
and feminist perspectives, Aristotelian virtue bioethics, ethics of caring, and 
theories founded on religion, casuistry,6 pragmatism, and even law and 
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economics.  Those who practice the art of bioethics show a similar 
diversity, coming from the ranks of philosophers, theologians, physicians, 
nurses, and lawyers.  Although on-the-job training with hospital ethics 
committees and research review boards once was the norm, many 
bioethicists now hold graduate degrees in the subject.7 
Bioethics as a discipline has come of age in the past decade or so, and its 
practitioners have become prominent and influential players in the public 
policy arena.  Clinical and academic bioethicists, who hold staff positions 
within hospitals and tenured faculty positions within university-affiliated 
bioethics centers, are increasingly a force to be reckoned with as they opine 
to the media on virtually a daily basis, advise the president and the 
administration through membership on influential governmental bioethics 
commissions, and provide expert testimony at congressional hearings on 
bioethics matters.  In fact, critics accuse the bioethics profession of having 
anointed its members as society’s “philosopher-kings.”8 
Why has society been so eager to turn to these self-appointed experts?  
Although the reasons are undoubtedly complex, and far beyond the scope of 
this article, one reason stands out: scientific advancements have forced us to 
confront novel issues, and we have turned to bioethics to help us make 
sense of this brave new world where everything (physical appearance, life 
span, genetic composition, even death itself) seems subject to alteration and 
manipulation.  Thus, the field of bioethics has been at the forefront on such 
issues as the right to die, physician-assisted death, abortion, human 
experimentation, organ donation and transplantation, genetic manipulation, 
and most recently, human stem cell research, and cloning.  These latter two 
topics, stem cell research and the cloning of human embryos, have 
embroiled scientists, government officials, the biotechnology industry, 
bioethicists, and the general public in an intense debate over the ethics of 
research on human embryos, with some seeking an outright ban and others 
seeking to accelerate the rate at which this type of research advances. 
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B.  Human Stem Cell Research 
Human stem cells are extraordinary cells in that they are pluripotent, 
meaning that they have the capacity, under the right circumstances, to 
develop into any type of cell (blood, heart, muscle, liver, kidney, etc.).  
Although stem cells can be isolated in adults,9 the most promising source is 
the very early embryo, more accurately termed a blastocyst.  In early 
embryological development, these stem cells begin to migrate and 
eventually differentiate and develop into all of the tissues and organs of the 
human body.10 
The scientific potential for human stem cells is enormous—stem cells 
could theoretically be coaxed to differentiate into brain cells to cure 
Parkinson’s disease or repair a quadriplegic’s severed spinal cord, into 
insulin cells to cure diabetes or heart muscle to replace tissue damaged by a 
heart attack.  However, because extracting the stem cells requires 
destruction of the human embryo, their medical and scientific promise has 
run afoul of the right to life debate.  In 1996, Congress had passed an 
amendment (the Dickey Amendment) to an appropriations bill for the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) that banned any federal funding for 
research in which human embryos were damaged or destroyed.11  The goal 
was to slow down or stop this kind of research; however, the result was just 
the opposite because embryo research did not stop—it just moved to the 
private sector, where it was and is still completely unfettered by 
governmental control.    
In 1998, scientists working in the private sector announced that they had 
successfully extracted stem cells from human embryos and cultured them 
into stem cell lines, which could then be used for experimentation.12  This 
announcement caused quite a public stir, prompting President Clinton to ask 
his National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to prepare a report 
on stem cell research.13  In 1999, NBAC issued a report that supported 
federal funding for stem cell research using embryos already in existence 
(for example, spare embryos donated by individuals undergoing in vitro 
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fertilization), but not for research involving embryos that were created 
specifically for the purpose of stem cell extraction.14 
In the meantime, the NIH, which had opposed the amendment banning 
federal funding for human embryo research, decided to try an end run 
around it.  The NIH obtained a legal opinion from the Department of Health 
and Human Services that stated that although the amendment prohibited the 
NIH from funding research that directly created or destroyed human 
embryos, the NIH could fund research on embryonic stem cells extracted 
from embryos that had been destroyed by someone else.15  Based on this 
somewhat strained interpretation, the NIH proceeded to publish guidelines 
in August of 2000 for federally funded embryonic stem cell research.  
However, before the guidelines could be implemented, the 2000 presidential 
election resulted in a change in administration and a shift in stem cell 
politics. 
In April 2001, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. 
Thompson ordered a halt to the NIH review of funding proposals so that the 
administration could review the issue, which effectively blocked the NIH 
from providing federal funds for stem cell research.16  A few months later, 
President Bush announced that he would allow limited federal funding for 
stem cell research, but only if the researchers used stem cell lines17 already 
in existence as of August 9, 2001.18  He subsequently created his own 
bioethics commission, the President’s Council on Bioethics, and asked for a 
report on the ethics and science of human cloning and stem cell research.19  
After six months of study and debate, a divided council produced a report in 
July 2002 that called for a four-year moratorium on the cloning of human 
embryos, but declined to recommend a permanent ban, disappointing the 
White House and conservative groups.20  Since then, numerous attempts to 
pass a federal ban on all cloning activities have failed to make it through 
Congress. 
Despite all of the twists and turns on this issue in the public sector, 
privately funded embryo and stem cell research has continued unabated.  
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One of the issues that has arisen is how to prevent a person’s immune 
system from rejecting the “foreign” cells and tissues that might be derived 
from embryonic stem cells.  Scientists funded by a company called 
Advanced Cell Therapeutics (ACT) hit upon human embryonic cloning as a 
way around this problem.21  Simply put, they extracted the nucleus of a 
somatic cell from an adult (for example, scrapings of cheek cells from 
inside the mouth) and injected it into an egg from which they had removed 
the nucleus.  By using chemical or electrical stimulation, scientists were 
able to stimulate this cell to start dividing, producing a blastocyst or early 
embryo that was the identical genetic clone of the adult who had donated 
the somatic cell.  The theory was that stem cells extracted from this cloned 
embryo would not be rejected by the immune system of the adult who, for 
example, needed new heart tissue or new insulin-producing cells.  This 
process was termed “therapeutic cloning,” or more precisely, somatic cell 
nuclear transfer. 
When word got out on what ACT had done, all hell broke loose.  In 
addition to the ethical issues posed by the creation of embryos to destroy 
them and the manipulation of human genetic material through somatic cell 
nuclear transfer, people were concerned that this work might lead to 
“reproductive cloning,” in which the resultant cloned embryos were actually 
transferred to a woman’s uterus and brought to term.  It is a brave new 
world, indeed. 
These scientific developments, the corresponding ethical issues they have 
raised,22 and the rather anomalous lack of regulatory control over privately 
funded embryo and stem cell research within the biotechnology sector, have 
led to an interesting phenomenon in which some members of the industry 
have voluntarily sought to bring bioethics into their boardrooms.  
III.  PRIVATE ETHICS ADVISORY BOARDS 
The private ethics advisory board is one of the emerging mechanisms 
being used by corporations to import bioethics analysis into the 
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biotechnology industry.  Geron Corporation and Advanced Cell 
Therapeutics are two of the many companies that have instituted private 
ethics advisory boards, and their experiences provide useful case studies 
through which to examine the benefits and problems associated with 
bringing bioethics into the corporate boardroom.  These case studies raise 
important questions as to whether the use of private ethics consultation is a 
genuine corporate effort to bring societal values and concerns to bear on 
contested areas of scientific research, or whether bioethicists are being co-
opted and used in the pursuit of corporate profits.  
A.  The Geron Experience 
Geron Corporation, a publicly held biotechnology enterprise located in 
Menlo Park, California, has been at the forefront of research involving 
human stem cells.  Its founder, Michael West, has variously been described 
as a “merchant of immortality,”23 “a headstrong provocateur,”24 and “a 
corporate, religious, scientific P.T. Barnum.”25  In his quest to develop 
replaceable cells and tissues to combat the aging process, West realized 
early on the tremendous potential of human stem cell research.  In the kind 
of collaborative arrangement between private industry and the scientific 
academy that is so common today, Geron signed agreements with James 
Thomson, a scientist at the University of Wisconsin, and John Gearhart, a 
scientist at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, to fund their work with 
embryonic and fetal stem cells.26  As a result of Thomson’s and Gearhart’s 
efforts, Geron announced on November 5, 1998, that its teams of scientists 
had succeeded in establishing cell culture lines of human embryonic stem 
cells.27  This breakthrough had tremendous scientific implications, but it 
also raised profound ethical questions. 
Because the work involved extracting and manipulating stem cells 
derived from blastocysts (early embryos) and aborted fetuses,28 the research 
raised important issues regarding the moral status of the embryos, aborted 
fetuses, and the cells derived from them, as well as “questions about the 
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interplay between private funding and public oversight of morally contested 
research.”29  In recognition of, and in preparation for, the media frenzy and 
public outcry that would almost certainly accompany public disclosure of 
this research, Geron had created an independent Ethics Advisory Board 
(EAB) in early 1998 to consult and give advice to the corporation on the 
bioethical aspects of the research it was funding.30 
The Geron EAB was made up of five individuals with health care ethics 
experience and a range of philosophical and theological backgrounds.31  It 
met over a period of months preceding the November 1998 announcement 
to consider the ethical issues surrounding research on human embryonic 
stem cells, and ultimately concluded that this type of research could be 
conducted ethically.32  The EAB, however, did delineate a number of ethical 
conditions for research using human embryonic stem cells.33  The EAB also 
acknowledged the need for continued public discourse on such difficult 
ethical issues as who should control the disposition of embryonic or fetal 
tissue, the proper relationship between proprietary biotechnology 
companies and ethics boards, and the role of consensus on contested moral 
issues in a deeply pluralistic society.34 
As expected, within weeks of publishing the data, Geron and the two 
teams of scientists who had done the actual work were swept up into a 
frenzied political, scientific, and public debate.35  One element of Geron’s 
corporate response to questions raised about the ethics of human stem cell 
research was to make available the Ethics Advisory Board report,36 
presumably to illustrate the company’s responsible approach to research and 
to help justify its decision to proceed with embryonic stem cell research.  
Once the work of the Geron EAB became public, other biotechnology 
corporations saw the potential utility of implementing this model, and 
shortly thereafter, ACT commissioned its own independent bioethics board.       
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B.  The Advanced Cell Therapeutics Experience 
ACT is a privately held biotechnology corporation located in Worcester, 
Massachusetts; interestingly, its president and CEO is Michael West, the 
founder of Geron.37  After leaving Geron in 1997, West moved to Advanced 
Cell Therapeutics and proceeded to position it to compete directly with his 
old company.  Because Geron held the exclusive rights to the processes for 
obtaining human stem cells from existing embryos and aborted fetuses, 
West began looking for an alternative source of stem cells.38  He found that 
alternative source through experiments involving the creation of cloned 
human embryos from which scientists could derive human embryonic stem 
cells.39   
If Geron had been treading on morally unstable ground with its stem cell 
research using existing embryos, ACT was diving headfirst into quicksand 
in its attempt to clone human embryos.  West was undoubtedly aware of 
Geron’s Ethics Advisory Board, through his prior connection with that 
company and because the Geron EAB’s workings and report had been made 
public.  Not surprisingly, ACT soon had its own private ethics advisory 
board, staffed by individuals with experience in health care and bioethics.40  
On November 25, 2001, ACT announced that it had successfully created 
the world’s first cloned human embryo, setting off another firestorm of 
media attention and raising additional ethical concerns.41  These flames 
were fanned by public statements made by Glenn McGee, a philosopher and 
assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics, 
that he had resigned from ACT’s Ethics Advisory Board in October of 
2000.42  His resignation had been prompted by an incident in which a 
reporter had asked him to make a televised comment on an unnamed 
biotechnology company that had cloned a wild gaur, an endangered species.  
Professor McGee went on record to say that the company was 
inappropriately “playing God,” only to discover later that ACT was the 
company that had conducted the cloning research.43  ACT’s secretive 
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nature, exemplified by its failure to disclose or discuss this work with the 
EAB, was the final straw that led to McGee’s resignation.44 
When Professor McGee went public with his concerns in the wake of 
ACT’s announcement that it was beginning to experiment with cloning 
human embryos, commentators began to raise questions about the ethics of 
these private boards and the individuals who agreed to serve on them.  This 
was an absolutely fascinating development: the ethics advisory board model 
for the private industry had created a crisis in ethics for the very profession 
that held itself out to be experts on the subject—the bioethics community.45 
IV.  BIOETHICS IN THE BOARDROOM 
Although corporate ethics advisory boards have received the most 
attention, some companies have sought professional bioethics advice 
without going through the process of creating their own ethics boards.  For 
example, the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine, a private fertility 
clinic in Norfolk, Virginia, consulted three separate panels of bioethics 
experts before mixing eggs and sperm to create human embryos solely to 
harvest their stem cells for experimentation.46  Because the Jones Institute 
refused to name the panels that had approved its work, it was not clear who 
had participated in the deliberations, where these panels had come from, or 
whether this was a one-time consultation or a continuing relationship.47  
Another mechanism used by corporations has been to seek counsel from an 
individual bioethicist rather than a group of experts.  That this is a common 
occurrence has become apparent as bioethicists are increasingly pushed, as 
a matter of professional ethics, to disclose their working and financial 
relationships with corporations.48    
Whether by bioethics advisory committee, outside panel, or individual 
consultation, the biotechnology industry is now regularly bringing bioethics 
into the boardroom.  Some of the questions relevant to corporate ethics in 
health care are whether this practice reflects a shift or maturation in 
corporate culture—a concerted effort to create a “bioethical climate”49 that 
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both supports and encourages bioethics discourse and deliberation—and 
whether this practice has a beneficial effect on decision making within the 
research enterprise.50  The answers to these questions requires a more in-
depth analysis of corporate motivation and the structural components of the 
relationship between corporations and their bioethics consultants. 
A.  Corporate Motivation 
The motivation question asks why corporations are choosing to bring 
bioethicists into the corporate fold.  Is it for the laudable goal of adding 
bioethics-based analyses (which would include societal costs and benefits) 
into the mix so that private corporate research agendas are not determined 
solely on the bases of financial costs and benefits to the particular corporate 
enterprise?  In other words, are these companies making a sincere effort to 
internalize bioethical theory and questioning, seeking guidance on novel 
issues, so that bioethics reasoning becomes part of the corporate ethical 
culture?  Or, are bioethicists and ethics advisory boards merely intended as 
window dressing?  Are they merely public relations tools designed to 
placate and pacify the public and the media, providing the appearance of 
morality and concern for the larger looming social questions and lending 
credibility to otherwise troubling research, while the corporations continue 
their pursuit of purely profit-driven agendas? 
When ACT’s cloning of human embryos caused a public stir, ACT did 
not hesitate to justify its work on the basis of the Ethics Advisory Board’s 
conclusion that the cloned embryos did not have the same moral standing as 
conventional human embryos.51  Is this an example of a corporate enterprise 
engaging in ethical research, or is the EAB just a public relations ploy?52  
As is so often the case, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.  
Motivation is always difficult to discern, and even more so when the actor 
in question is a corporate entity, which may have a public face but multiple 
layers of private interaction.  Furthermore, corporations can operate with 
mixed motives, and private profit-based motives sometimes align and 
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coincide with larger societal interests.  To some extent, we are left to infer 
motive from the way in which corporations structure their relationships with 
bioethics consultants. 
B.  Structural Aspects of the Bioethicist-Corporate Relationship 
1.  Objectivity and Independence 
If the societal goals of bioethics consultation are to be met, it is critical 
that the individuals reviewing the research operate with as much objectivity 
and independence as possible.  However, as a practical matter, how truly 
independent can a private EAB be from the corporation that created it?  Are 
corporate EABs or individual bioethics consultants predisposed in favor of 
their corporation’s research agendas?    The answers to these questions 
depend in part on the criteria by which the bioethicists are chosen, the 
existence of uniform standards for bioethics consultation, and the financial 
arrangements between corporation and ethics advisor. 
a.  Membership Criteria 
What are the qualities that a corporate sponsor should look for when 
choosing the members of an ethics advisory board or hiring a bioethics 
consultant?  What constellation of knowledge, skills, experience, and 
beliefs provides the ideal background for doing this kind of work?  If a 
corporation desires a robust debate, a critical review of research proposals 
from a number of different perspectives, and a process wherein the hard 
questions are asked and advisors are encouraged to be thoughtful and 
comprehensive in their analyses and recommendations, the structure of the 
advisory body should arguably mirror the size and complexity of the task.  
This level of research review would call for perhaps ten to fifteen 
individuals with wide-ranging experiences and a broad variety of 
backgrounds and perspectives (for example, community activists, 
philosophers, theologians, scientists, health care workers and consumers, 
and lawyers). 
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Because ethical consultation is an entirely voluntary process, there are no 
rules or regulations regarding EAB membership.  However, a useful 
analogy exists between the EAB and another type of board, the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).  By federal law, all research performed or funded by 
the federal government that involves human subjects must be reviewed by 
an IRB; the IRB’s purpose is to protect human subjects.53  Pursuant to the 
federal regulations, all IRBs must have at least five members with varying 
backgrounds, with at least one member having scientific expertise and at 
least one with a nonscientific background.  No IRB can consist entirely of 
members of only one profession.54    
The numbers for Geron’s and ACT’s EABs, however, are somewhat 
lower and the heterogeneity appears to be considerably less.  Geron’s EAB 
had five members;55 ACT’s had nine.56 It is not at all unusual for 
biotechnology corporations to hire only one ethicist to provide consultation 
and review of its research proposals.57  Furthermore, it seems likely that 
corporations “shop” for bioethicists who have previously taken positions 
consonant with the research the corporation wishes to undertake.  Advanced 
Cell Therapeutics went so far as to allow one of the principal investigators 
in its human embryo cloning research to sit on its EAB and participate in 
the ethics review of that very same research.58  This is perhaps an extreme 
example, but as Dr. Daniel Callahan59 remarked, “These companies are 
smart enough to know that there are a variety of views on these subjects, 
and with a little bit of asking or shopping around you can find a group that 
will be congenial to what you are doing.”60  Of course, if corporations are 
engaging in this kind of viewpoint cherry-picking, they are just following 
the lead of our political leaders, who have done precisely the same thing 
when setting up governmental bioethics advisory boards and 
commissions.61 
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b.  Uniform Standards 
Given that the choice of bioethics consultants may well be skewed in 
favor of corporate research objectives, the application of uniform bioethics 
standards, both procedural and substantive, in corporate bioethics 
consulting would assist in ensuring the desired level of objectivity.  This is 
where a comparison to outside, independent auditors in the ordinary 
corporate setting may be particularly useful.  One of the protections of the 
business auditing system is that outside auditors operate under a set of 
nationally standardized and accepted accounting principles and procedures.  
Unfortunately, within the discipline of bioethics, virtually everything is 
contested: overarching theories, underlying principles, modes of analysis, 
and the relevance of value systems, including religious beliefs.  In fact, one 
of the primary goals of bioethics as a discipline is to encourage people to 
ask questions, to discuss, to educate themselves, and to look at these 
contested issues from multiple perspectives.  This inherently non-
standardized approach makes it difficult to imagine that the analytical 
framework could (or should) be agreed upon in order to provide protection 
against corporate coercion and influence and to ensure objectivity on the 
part of ethics consultants. 
c.  Financial Relationship  
Another important determinant of objectivity and independence is the 
nature of the financial relationship between the bioethicist and the 
corporation.  Some commentators have questioned whether it is ethical for 
bioethicists to receive any compensation for this kind of work,62 and the 
financial compensation issue is causing a schism within the bioethics 
community.  Positions run the gamut from essentially “we shouldn’t take a 
penny for providing this advice”63 to “of course we should be well 
compensated for our expertise.”64 
If compensation is appropriate, and there is certainly a reasonable 
argument that bioethicists should not be expected to work for free,65 then 
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what level of compensation is large enough to adequately compensate ethics 
board members for their time and expertise, but not so great as to render 
them mere shills of the corporation?  Members of Geron’s EAB received a 
$1,000 honorarium for each scheduled meeting with staff and officers, but 
they were not compensated for time spent researching and writing, and 
members did not hold any stock in the corporation.66  The ACT advisory 
board members set their own compensation at the outset; they chose $200 
per day plus expenses for attending four quarterly meetings of the board, 
with no additional compensation for time spent on research, telephone, or e-
mail conversations.67  Although these amounts seem relatively de minimis, 
there are reports of ethics advisors to corporations making tens of thousands 
of dollars per year.68 
A task force on bioethics consultation proposed the following limits on 
compensation: no contingency fees; the rate of compensation and the value 
of any equity interest should not depend on the conclusions reached; the 
compensation should not be so great that the consultant would be 
embarrassed if the amount became known; and finally, the compensation 
should not be large enough that the consultant comes to depend on the 
income.69  Of course, the fact that the task force felt the need to propose 
compensation guidelines reinforces the concern that some bioethicists are 
making substantial amounts of money by providing consulting services to 
biotechnology corporations, and perhaps compromising their professional 
integrity in the process.70  
2.  Timing 
With the remarkable rapidity with which this kind of science is 
advancing, and the premium that the market places on being the first to do 
something (with the concomitant race to the patent office), the timing issue 
looms large.  Given this emphasis on speed, how can a private ethics 
advisory board or individual bioethics consultant take the time necessary to 
educate, deliberate, and produce advice to the corporation that is reflective, 
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thoughtful, and comprehensive?  And yet, without an adequate time frame, 
the deliberative process and ultimate work product are unquestionably 
compromised. 
The ethics review done by Geron’s EAB is a good illustration of the 
timing problem.  The ethics board, which was constituted in early 1998, 
apparently began its work after the company’s research on human stem 
cells was already well under way.71  Furthermore, the EAB statement of 
ethical guidelines for research with human embryonic stem cells was not 
drafted until September 1998 and was not finalized until late October, just a 
few days before the November 5 publication in Science of Geron’s stem cell 
breakthrough.72  At best, then, the EAB’s guidelines operated as an after-
the-fact ethics “stamp of approval” for the way Geron had already 
conducted its research, rather than providing guidance and advice 
beforehand.  Furthermore, the incomplete nature of the bioethics analysis 
contained within the report that explicated the guidelines was, to some 
extent, a reflection of the relatively short time frame (several months) 
within which the board had to work. 73  
A cynical take on this timing would suggest that the Geron EAB was 
intended to operate as little more than a public relations arm of the 
corporation.  However, this assessment is probably overly harsh.  Geron and 
its EAB should be evaluated within the context of the difficulties inherent in 
trying to operate ahead of a scientific field that is advancing at light speed, 
and the fact that EABs were just coming into existence in 1998.  Still, as 
one commentator remarked, it’s hard to imagine that the members of 
Geron’s advisory board felt free to disapprove of research that had already 
taken place and was on the verge of publication.74  
In contrast, the ACT’s EAB seems to have performed under a more 
reasonable time frame, which in theory would allow for more nuanced and 
comprehensive bioethics debate and deliberation.  Over a year before ACT 
began its experiments to clone human embryos as a source for stem cells, 
the corporation had put its EAB in place and worked with it to try to 
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develop a responsible and ethical research plan.75  Of course, the validity of 
ACT’s claim to responsible research was called into question by one-time 
board member McGee’s allegations that the company had not made a full 
disclosure of its research activities to the EAB.76 
3.  Corporate Accountability 
The corporate accountability issue is the extent to which the corporation 
is required to give effect to the bioethics consultant’s or board’s 
recommendations.   Interestingly, Michael West disclosed that when the 
idea of establishing an ethics board first arose at Geron, the company 
concluded that giving an ethics board the power to veto research projects 
would undermine the corporation’s fiduciary obligations to its 
shareholders.77  Hence the name “ethics advisory board.”  In keeping with 
this view, Karen Lebacqz, the chair of the Geron EAB, acknowledged that 
the company was “perfectly at liberty to ignore all our advice.”78  West took 
the same position once he became President and CEO at Advance Cell 
Therapeutics, asserting that veto power over research directions rested 
exclusively with the privately held corporation’s board of directors.79 
However, just because corporations do not bind themselves to follow 
recommendations or advice, it does not necessarily follow that there is no 
accountability.  According to members of ACT’s EAB, the company and its 
researchers took the ethics review process seriously, adopting every single 
one of the board’s recommendations on its human cloning research, even 
when doing so slowed or impeded the research.80  The Ethics Advisory 
Board postulated that ACT’s responsiveness may have flowed from respect 
for the process it had set up, a genuine desire for guidance on novel 
scientific and ethical issues, and/or the realization that board members could 
embarrass ACT if its recommendations were ignored.81  Publicly traded 
companies such as Geron may have an additional concern—that the public 
will hold them accountable for disregarding ethics recommendations by 
“voting with their feet.”  However, the general public can only hold these 
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companies accountable if it has access to the relevant information, which in 
turn rests on the degree of confidentiality that surrounds the bioethics 
consultation processes.  
4.  Transparency 
Transparency in this context has two applications.  The first is internal to 
the corporation and depends on an array of factors: whether the ethics 
consultants have access to all relevant information and to management and 
research-level employees; whether EAB members are invited to attend 
board of director meetings where research and development plans are 
discussed in detail; whether the consultants’ questions are answered fully; 
and whether the ethics board members feel free to have candid discussions 
with corporate representatives.  On this measure, the ACT board members 
described a system of transparency and free access to corporate officers, 
directors, and researchers.82    
The other application for transparency is the extent to which the review 
process and any conclusions or recommendations are disseminated to the 
public, as opposed to being kept confidential within the corporation.83  Are 
ethics board members free to talk openly and in public about the review 
process, the conclusions, and any disagreements over the corporate research 
direction?  The chair of the Geron EAB revealed that ethics board members 
were prohibited from publicly discussing the nature of a project that Geron 
had wanted to fund but had then abandoned after the ethics board raised 
objections to it.84  In contrast, although the ACT board members were 
required to sign a confidentiality agreement as to “nonpublic information,” 
the agreement also included that “nothing . . . shall impair or restrict the 
right of any member of the Ethics Advisory Board to comment publicly, 
speak or write concerning ethical issues,” provided that they didn’t disclose 
non-public, technical information.85  Michael West, the CEO of ACT, 
reassured the Ethics Advisory Board members that they would always have 
the “power of the pen” and the freedom to speak out whenever the company 
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ignored its advice.86  It is interesting to note, however, that ACT’s sitting 
EAB members have, thus far, used the power of the pen only to praise the 
company.87  Might this reflect the subtle but real danger that bioethicists 
will refrain from criticizing their corporate partners out of a concern that “it 
is a rare corporation that will continue to fund bioethicists who are 
constantly and publicly criticizing corporate policy”?88      
C.  The Ethical Crisis Within the Bioethics Profession 
What began as an issue of how to effectively bring bioethics into the 
boardroom of biotechnology corporations has now turned into an ethical 
crisis for the bioethics profession.  The simple fact that the contact with 
corporate culture that has occurred through EABs and individual 
consultations has caused members of the profession to dispute whether 
bioethicists can, consistent with professional ethics, provide compensated or 
even uncompensated advice to corporations. 
Within this debate there is certainly some common ground.  For example, 
most members of the profession would agree that the bioethicist’s first 
responsibility is to the public interest; the legitimacy of the profession 
comes directly from the fact that society has entrusted bioethics experts 
with the role of providing oversight to highly contested, complex, and 
potentially troubling scientific ventures.89  Virtually everyone would also 
agree that serving clients whose primary interest is profit maximization 
poses serious risks to the profession’s independence and integrity.90  
Bioethicists differ radically, however, on the appropriate response to these 
potential conflicts of interest, and their differences reflect a growing chasm 
within the field of bioethics.  Will bioethicists become advocates for the 
corporate enterprise over time, working to facilitate and justify corporations 
and their actions?  Will the entire profession become seduced and corrupted 
by corporate culture and the inducements it has to offer?  In a very real 
sense, individuals on both sides of this issue are fighting over the “soul” of 
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the bioethics profession, and the arguments have been heartfelt and even 
acrimonious.  
1.  Working from Within 
Advocates who favor ethics consultation with the for-profit, private 
sector assert that the profession has an obligation to promote the efforts of 
the business community to incorporate bioethics into their decision-making 
processes.91  In essence, they make an argument against the “ivory tower” 
view of bioethics; they assert that ethical theories and principles can 
influence the corporate sector only if bioethicists are willing to come down 
out of their towers and engage within the business culture.  For individuals 
on this side of the battle line, the key requirement is that any consultation, 
whether by group or individual, should be conducted in a responsible 
fashion that maximizes the bioethicists’ objectivity, independence, and 
impartiality.92 
Of course, there are a number of different ways that this end might be 
achieved.  A task force composed of influential bioethicists approached the 
problem by developing a set of voluntary guidelines for ethical bioethics 
consultation.93  The guidelines address several of the structural issues 
discussed earlier in this article such as the terms of the financial relationship 
between consultant and corporation, the need for both internal transparency, 
and at least some degree of public accountability.94  Other commentators 
have focused on disclosure of corporate affiliations as the primary 
mechanism for addressing conflicts of interest, although it is not always 
clear precisely what bioethicists should disclose or to whom they should 
disclose this information.95  Still others have suggested that although 
consultation activities are not per se unethical, compensation from 
corporations should either be limited (no stock options, no management 
board positions, de minimis payments)96 or bioethicists should provide these 
services for free.97  In response to this latter position, Professor Thomas 
Donaldson used a market analysis to argue that the idea of the bioethics 
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profession turning down compensation for consultation is downright “silly,” 
and that the bioethics profession’s “profit motive should be civilized, not 
destroyed.”98  He advocated the use of business ethics as a guide to the 
ethics of bioethics consultation, suggesting that guidelines developed to 
promote auditor independence in the accounting field can be applied equally 
well to bioethicists receiving compensation for their advice.99  Other 
approaches advocated by various commentators include the development of 
uniform best practices for ethics advisory boards, communication across 
EABs, and the development of private review bodies that are completely 
external and advise several corporations rather than just one.100 
2.  Standing Above the Fray 
Implicit throughout the various proposals described above is the 
proposition that corporate bioethics consultation is appropriate and within 
the bounds of professional ethics.  Those who either vehemently disagree 
with this position or have serious concerns begin by noting that bioethicists, 
through their writing, teaching, consulting, and policymaking, have 
historically served as overseers of the medical and scientific enterprise.101  
The critical issue is whether the profession can maintain the integrity and 
independence needed to function in this role if its members are being paid 
or otherwise rewarded by the very entities whose activities they are 
entrusted to monitor.  As Professor Carl Elliott so eloquently puts it, what 
happens when you “throw[] a bone to the watchdog?”102       
Although bioethicists working within academia or the medical field are 
regularly paid for their services, the concern is that working for a for-profit 
corporation is fundamentally different.  As Daniel Callahan explains, the 
cultures of business and bioethics are radically different in their motives and 
objectives, the interests they protect, and their moral subcultures.103  Unlike 
hospitals, universities, and academic bioethics centers, corporations have a 
direct financial interest in the opinions formed and the views expressed by 
their hired bioethicists.104  Biotechnology companies also have a great deal 
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of money to spend,105 and most of these consulting contracts do not come 
with a guarantee of academic freedom.106  As a result, Professor Elliott 
worries that “each corporate check cashed takes us one step closer to the 
notion of ethics as a commodity, a series of canned lectures, white papers, 
and consultation services to be purchased by the highest bidder.”107        
Monetary compensation is not the only inducement that corporations 
have to offer bioethics experts.  Professor Laurie Zoloth suggests that the 
profession ought to be equally concerned about other types of inducements, 
those that can be termed “social capital.”108  Bioethicists who wish to 
advance their careers naturally value and pursue activities that enhance their 
professional reputations and increase the demand for their services, 
opinions, and expertise.  They are only human and the lure of national 
fame—being quoted in the media, published in prestigious journals, named 
to national bioethics panels—is a potent elixir.109  Corporate consultancies 
are an important piece of this social capital, and even non-paying 
consultancies can enhance a bioethicist’s reputation and cachet.  The 
potential conflict of interest is clear; it is simply not good business practice 
for a biotechnology company to hire an ethics consultant who publicly 
criticizes or calls for a halt to corporate research practices.110  All of this 
taken together—the compromise to objectivity that can come from 
identification with and allegiance to a corporate client, the lack of external 
standards, the financial inducements, the seduction of status and fame—
creates a rather precarious basis for the societal trust that is so essential to 
the field of bioethics and its practitioners.111   
D.  Corporate Responsibility in the Realm of Bioethics 
The purpose of this article is not to solve the identity crisis within the 
bioethics profession, but rather to point out that the discussion thus far is 
surprisingly incomplete.  What is fascinating about all of the soul-searching 
is that no one has thought to suggest that corporations might bear some 
primary responsibilities in this regard.  Might biotechnology companies 
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have an obligation to utilize bioethics services in a manner that maximizes 
consultant objectivity and independence?  Should corporations be 
responsible for creating an internal ethical climate in which these kinds of 
consultations are taken seriously rather than used as public relations 
window dressing?  Should the issues raised regarding the structure of the 
bioethicist-corporation relationship be of concern to business as well as 
bioethics?  
This is where interdisciplinary conversation is so helpful, and it returns 
us to the power of Lynne Dallas’s conception of an ethical corporate 
climate.  The corporate and business voices are irrelevant to this 
conversation only if one is willing to accept that the corporate form cannot 
evolve; that corporations cannot be encouraged, expected, or required to 
maintain and follow ethical standards; that corporations have no 
responsibilities beyond those owed directly to their investors and 
shareholders.  Recent history, including the reaction to the Enron debacle, 
suggests that society and legal scholars are increasingly unwilling to accept 
these traditional premises. 
This is not to say that the process of determining and directing corporate 
responsibility in the area of bioethics consultation would be an easy one.  
The federal government’s position thus far to either deny or provide only 
very limited funding to embryo and stem cell research removes the 
spending power basis for federal regulation of the private biotechnology 
industry.  In addition, much of the work in the wake of Enron’s collapse has 
involved corporate responsibility in a context where it could be argued that 
implementing ethical practices would actually increase profits and 
shareholder value (or at least prevent bankruptcy).  In the biotechnology 
realm, we are facing a situation where a corporate decision to follow 
bioethics advice and forego a particular line of research or pursue it in a 
more ethically acceptable, but also more expensive, manner would likely 
result in a reduction in profits and investor value.           
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The reality, though, is that we are not talking about widgets here.  The 
corporate form is already an extremely complex moral and ethical playing 
field, but that complexity is magnified when the substrates with which the 
corporation works are the building blocks of life itself.  There may come a 
day when human embryos, stem cells, and individual genes are so divorced 
from their traditional biological origins, so commodified, that they have lost 
even their symbolic value.  Until that day, it is not unreasonable to expect 
corporate decision makers, despite the corporate profit-maximizing form, to 
answer to constituencies beyond the usual shareholders and investors.  
Bioethics is one mechanism by which societal values can be brought to bear 
on the corporate enterprise, but only if the climate is right.  
What might a “bioethical corporate climate” look like?  According to 
Dallas, the ethical climate of a corporation consists of the ethical meaning 
that employees attach to organizational practices and procedures that in turn 
reflect corporate norms and values.112  Perhaps the most important factor in 
creating and maintaining an ethical environment is management’s 
willingness to set the moral tone for the corporation.113  Officers and 
directors can achieve this by adopting a values-based approach in decision 
making,114 framing issues in ethical or moral terms when appropriate,115 
permitting ethical standards to actually influence business decisions,116 and 
appropriately managing conflicts of interest.117 
When one transfers these concepts from corporations generally to the 
biotechnology sector specifically, it becomes clear that many of the 
problems with bioethics consultations—suspect corporate motivation, 
conflicts of interest, lack of corporate accountability, insufficient public 
transparency—could be remedied if biotechnology corporations were to 
create a climate more hospitable to bioethical principles and process.  In 
fact, what was framed earlier as an identity crisis within bioethics could just 
as easily be framed as a crisis of ethics within the biotechnology industry.  
While this may seem like mere semantics, looking at the structure and 
process of bioethics consultation as a matter of corporate responsibility as 
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well as an issue for the bioethics profession greatly increases the likelihood 
that meaningful structural reforms can be achieved.  Solutions to many of 
the problems that surround the bioethicist-corporation relationship will 
require corporate initiative, or at least cooperation.  Thus, it makes perfect 
sense to view these issues from the additional perspective of corporate 
responsibility, and to support the development of corporate climates that 
will truly value and utilize the rich resources that the discipline of bioethics 
has to offer. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the words of one bioethicist, members of the bioethics profession, at 
their best, “introduce the social[] implications for the future, the history of 
past abuses, and the present considerations of justice,” they “pull the 
narrative frame from the private view within the institution to the larger 
world that surrounds the institution, a world of obligation, of suffering, of 
injustice, and of potential,” and they “see the problem of conflict as a 
radical opportunity, not an avoidable mistake.”118  Bioethicists “hold things 
in tension—the reasonableness of a marketplace, the realpolitik of private 
financing, the nature of social constraints of our health care funding, and the 
aspirations of justice,” and they “unpack[] the narratives, the analysis of 
truth claims, the interpretations of reality that divide by culture, class, race, 
and religious tradition.”119 
Given the high stakes involved in biotechnology research, especially in 
the morally contested areas of embryo and stem cell research, and given the 
societal value that bioethics discourse and discernment can bring to the 
boardroom table, efforts to import bioethics into the business of 
biotechnology are surely worth the struggle.  We ought not be surprised that 
the interface between bioethics and business cultures has the potential to 
produce change, positive and negative, in both cultures.  The challenge is to 
continue to improve the model for that interaction; Professor Dallas’s work 
on corporate ethics, which emphasizes corporate responsibility for creating 
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a favorable ethical climate, provides a powerful tool for furthering societal 
objectives within the for-profit biotechnology industry. 
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